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I. Introduction 
 
Rights abuse clauses are instruments that prohibit the use of rights to destroy other rights.  
For example, Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) prohibits any 
“group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms” contained in the ECHR.1 In practice this means 
that extremist political parties that use the right to free speech to advance a racist political 
agenda that might undermine the rights of other individuals in society not to suffer 
discrimination, can have their right to free speech restricted without that amounting to a 
human rights violation.  
Rights abuse clauses in international human rights instruments can be used by state parties to 
human rights instruments in two circumstances. Firstly, during the course of having their 
human rights performance reviewed by an international organization, such as a treaty review 
body attached to an international human rights treaty, a state party may cite the obligation 
under a rights abuse clause as a reason for a law that restricts political rights in their state. For 
instance, they may argue that a law criminalizing denial of the Holocaust is necessary to 
prevent extreme groups using their right to freedom of speech to destroy the rights and 
freedoms of individuals from religious and racial backgrounds that were persecuted in the 
Holocaust. Secondly, an international human rights court or review body can use a rights 
                                                          
 
1
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as 
amended) (ECHR), Article 17. 
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abuse clause to resist a petition from an individual who is complaining about the restriction of 
their rights under domestic law. For example the European Court of Human Rights has used 
Article 17 of the ECHR as grounds for denying applications from fascist and racist groups 
claiming that laws restricting racist speech were a violation of the free speech protections 
contained under Article 10 of the ECHR. Restrictions on human rights contained within anti-
racism laws are justified under a rights-abuse-clause framework by reasoning that acts of 
racist speech, or extremist political activities with racist undertones, are in some way outside 
of a human rights instrument and manifestations behaviour that a human rights instrument 
was designed to prohibit. This reasoning, however, implicitly alludes to the existence of a 
broader anti-totalitarian consensus that seemingly defies the more liberal notion of free 
speech.  
This paper argues that rights abuse clauses are a reflection of a distinctly European concern 
about the emergence of totalitarianism.  In the instruments that contain them, they are a 
reflection of the dominant concern at the time of that instrument’s drafting that legally 
enforceable human rights were necessary to guard against European style totalitarianism by 
denying rights to groups that threatened the very framework of rights. In this respect they 
represent what Stiina Loytomaki describes as the “Europeanization” of memory when it 
comes to the purpose of human rights, as they seek to position rights as both under threat 
from and a remedy to an ever-present totalitarian threat.
2
 Whilst the threat Western European 
democracies faced from totalitarian political parties was real in the 1940s and 1950s, over 
half a century later rights abuse clauses remain an operational component of some human 
rights instruments. In the Post-Cold War world rights abuse clauses have become what 
Jessica Auchter calls a sign of “haunting” within the human rights instruments that contain 
                                                          
2
Stiina Loytomaki Law and the Politics of Memory: Confronting the Past (Routledge 2014) 21-22. 
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them.
3
 Auchter’s analysis of public memorials of national tragedies, identifies how the 
politics of the memory of life and death “signpost sites of memory” and consequently 
influence the political foundations at “work in the contestation of the modern state.”4 In a 
similar way the construction of a human rights instrument can be haunted with the politics of 
its foundations and rights abuse clauses, as this article demonstrates, are a sign of an 
instrument’s foundational politics.  
Rights abuse clauses are distinctly European historical memories. In the first section of this 
paper, which discusses the history of the law, it is argued that they interwoven with shared 
hopes and fears about the future of western society.  Their presence in ‘living instruments’ 
makes rights abuse clauses not just mere historical artefacts but components of working legal 
regimes with the expressed purpose of protecting human rights.  As the second section of this 
paper notes, whilst rights abuses clauses go some way to addressing the concern famously 
expressed by Hannah Arendt about the need to protect the ‘right to have rights’ in practice 
rights abuse clauses are unnecessary to address the actions of racist groups wishing to violate 
the rights of others. As the final section of this paper argues, the historical reference within 
rights abuse clauses actually allows international human rights tribunals to make rulings 
about the restrictions on rights by national authorities, in particular the right to free speech, 
that are deeply illiberal and seemingly antithetical to the liberal foundations of human rights 
instruments. Significantly the presence of these provisions, and their subsequent 
interpretation by tribunals, gives an insight into a distinct counter-history of the human rights 
instruments that possess them. Rather than being a collection of inherently liberal values with 
a distinctly liberal telos, an international human rights instrument with a rights abuse clause is 
                                                          
3
 Jessica Auchter The Politics of Haunting and Memory in International Relations (Routledge 2014) p.4.  
4
 Ibid. 6.  
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also an instrument that allows governments to heavily direct and control the exercise of 
certain rights.  
II. The anti-totalitarian  nature of Rights Abuse clauses  
 
Article 30 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the first rights 
abuse clause in an international human rights instrument. It denied a “group or person any 
right to engage in any activity or …perform any act aimed at the destruction of any …rights 
and freedoms” contained within the UDHR. 5  In a number of post-war constitutions in 
Western European states, similar provisions were adopted expressly to guard against the 
possibility of communist or fascist movements using the democratic process to gain power.
6
 
There are only two rights abuse clauses currently in operation - Article 17 of the ECHR and 
Article 5 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) - although 
there are some equivalent provisions in other international instruments.
7
 The Convention on 
the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has a number of different 
clauses that have a similar effect. Article 4 requires state parties to punish all “dissemination 
of ideas based on racial superiority” and to “prohibit organisations” that promote “racial 
discrimination” which in practice acts as a rights abuse clause as it determines the parameters 
of certain rights, such as the freedom of speech and association.
8
 Whilst these CERD 
provisions may have a degree of equivalence, they are based on principles of non-
discrimination, which require a demonstration of the discriminatory effect of a particular 
                                                          
5
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 10 December 1948, UN General Assembly 217 A (III), Article 30.  
6
 Hannes Cannie and Dirk Voorhoof ‘The Abuse clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human Rights 
Convention: an Added value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection?’ (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights 54.  
7
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171.  
8
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination  (adopted December 21 1965) 660 UNTS 
195, Article 4. 
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social, political or economic process before legal restrictions or prohibitions limiting other 
rights can be justified.
9
 The justification for the limitation of participatory rights in anti-racist 
laws is less historically contingent under a prohibition-of-discrimination framework than 
under a rights-abuse-clause framework. Rights abuse clauses are often invoked by a 
supranational human rights tribunal or a state party by way of a collateral challenge at the 
admissibility stage of a tribunal’s consideration of an individual petition, alleging an abuse of 
individual rights as a result of domestic laws that aim to combat racism - such as incitement 
to racial hatred laws.  
Neither the American Convention on Human Rights nor the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (ACHPR) has a directly equivalent clause prohibiting and protecting against 
rights abuse. Article 61 of the ACHPR allows the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples Rights (and now the African Court of Human Rights) to refer to international law in 
the interpretation of the Charter, making it theoretically possible for the Commission to 
utilize Article 5 of the ICCPR in relation to a decision on participatory rights.
10
   Article 5 of 
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in a similar 
fashion to the ICCPR prohibits “any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or 
freedoms” contained in the Covenant. Both the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights and state reports to the Committee have made scant reference to this provision and its 
limited development reflects the fact that the majority of references to rights abuse has been 
in relation to forms of discrimination dealt with by other aspects of the Convention.
11
 Neither 
the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
nor the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) contain a rights abuse clause even 
                                                          
9
 For an outline the CERD and its processes see Patrick Thornberry ‘Confronting Racial Discrimination: a CERD perspective’ 
(2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 239.  
10
 The African Commission has previous done this before in  Commission Nationale des Droits de l’ Homme des Libertes v 
Chad, Communication No. 74/92 (1995).  
11
 M. Magdalena Sepúlveda ‘The nature of the obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ (Intersentia, 2003) 308-309. 
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though there are provisions within both instruments that are capable being used to undermine 
other rights. As a consequence this paper focuses on the application of Article 17 of the 
ECHR and Article 5 of ICCPR. Significantly whilst Article 17 has a wider application against 
terrorist movements, Article 5 has only been applied in petitions to the Human Rights 
Committee (the ICCPR’s review body) that relate to the prohibition of fascism or 
communism. 
Rights abuse clauses were not originally formulated as anti-racism provisions and the 
available historical evidence indicates they were provisions that were designed to prevent a 
repeat of the totalitarianism that occurred in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s.  The discussion 
surrounding Article 30 of the UDHR centred around the prevention of a fascist like regime 
gaining power by constitutional means and then destroying rights. Andrew Moravcsik argues 
that human rights treaties require a common political consensus behind them to give them 
operational legitimacy and in the context of the ECHR’s formation in the late 1940s this 
common consensus was embodied in both the memory of World War Two and the ongoing 
fight against Communism.
12
 The foundational legitimacy of an organisation can also explain 
why states agree to be bound by an enforcement regime that may constrain their sovereignty 
in the future.
13
  The memory of Nazism and the Holocaust was able to provide this 
foundation because, as Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider argue, the Holocaust’s fact and 
imagery, from the early 1960s onwards, played a central role in the fashioning of a common 
European cultural memory.
14
  
                                                          
12
 Andrew Moravcsik ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe’ (2000) 54 
International Organization 217. 
13
 Moravcsik ‘Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe’ (1995) 1 European 
Journal of International Relations 157. 
14
 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider ‘Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Foundation of Cosmopolitan Memory’  (2002) 
5 European Journal of Social Theory 87.  
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The direct impact of this common European cultural memory on the ECHR is debateable and 
as Daniel Cohen argues in many ways the ECHR is a forward looking instrument that seeks 
to “generalize social democracy” and create a “political consensus on the importance of 
individual liberty in Europe.” 15  Cohen also casts doubts on histories of the UDHR that 
attempt to read its formation and content as a direct response to the Holocaust.
16
 It is crucial 
to understand that the UDHR did not contain a victim-orientated conception of rights – 
human rights were not seen as a remedy to the atrocities of the Holocaust or as an insurance 
mechanism against future atrocities. As Samuel Moyn notes in the 1940s discussions about 
human rights, “centred on their welfarist meaning” and that the rights discourse surrounding 
the creation of the UDHR, was focused competing visions of what society would look like.
17
  
The European Movement, a Brussels based think-tank like organisation had in 1949 
published a pamphlet justifying the creation of a legal human rights regime as a “system of 
collective security against tyranny and oppression.”18 Whilst attempting to frame either the 
ICCPR or the ECHR as a general response to the Holocaust is problematic there are some 
individual components of both documents that reflect the contemporary concerns of the 
drafters. Rights abuse clauses are one of these components, as the Travaux Préparatoires of 
both instruments illustrate, both Article 17 of the ECHR and Article 5 of the ICCPR were 
intended to be used against political organizations that might form totalitarian governments. 
The discussion around the drafting of Article 17 reflected wider concerns at the time of the 
ECHR’s drafting that a democratic society needed to be able to defend itself from Nazism, 
fascism and communism. In the year prior to the creation of the ECHR a number of countries 
had been taken over by Stalinist communist regimes, Berlin had just experienced a blockade 
                                                          
15
 Daniel Cohen ‘The Holocuast and the Human Rights Revolution: A Reassessment’ from A Iriye et al. (eds.) The Human 
Rights Revolution an International History (OUP 2012) 63.   
16
 Ibid. 64.   
17
 Samuel Moyn Human Rights and the Uses of History (Verso Books 2014) 89-91. 
18
 Opp Cite Michael Goldhaber A People’s History of the European Court of Human Rights (New Jersey 2009) 4.  
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by Soviet Forces and France was being destabilised by communist led strikes.  Western 
Europe was still economically devastated from World War Two and it is easy to forget the 
scale of Nazi collaboration that had occurred in both France and Holland, both of which had 
been nominal democracies in the mid 1930s.
19
 Therefore the idea that democracy could be 
taken over by totalitarian forces of the left or right was very real to the drafters of the ECHR. 
These concerns tapped into a wider historical phenomenon within Post-War Europe as the 
newly restored and surviving democratic governments found themselves caught in a crisis of 
legitimacy as their only source of legitimacy seemed to stem from military victory. This was 
ideologically problematic as the historian Tony Judt rhetorically observed “how were they 
[the democratic powers] better than the wartime Fascist regimes themselves?”20 This crisis of 
conceptual legitimacy was accompanied by a very real political crisis created by millions of 
displaced and stateless persons throughout Europe and very weak constitutional institutions 
which meant that takeover by Stalinist communism was a real possibility in some states.  In a 
speech to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1949 the French Minister of 
Information Pierre-Henri Teitgen warned that “democracies do not become Nazi countries in 
one day” instead minorities “[removed] the levers of control” making it “necessary to 
intervene before it is too late.”21 The British delegate to the Consultative Assembly, Lord 
MacNally, warned that any human rights instrument developed by the Council of Europe 
must be capable of resisting “attempts to undermine our democratic way of life from within 
or without” and that such an instrument would have to “give Western Europe as a whole 
greater political stability.”22 Draft versions of the text show that Article 17 was expressly 
                                                          
19
Mark Mazower Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (Penguin Books, 2013) Chp.13. 
20
 Tony Judt Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (Vintage 2007) 41. 
21
 AH Robertson and JG Merrills Human Rights in Europe: A study of the European Convention on Human Rights (2
nd
 ed. 
Manchester 1996) 4.   
22
 Collected Edition of the “Travaux Preparatoires of the European Convention on Human Rights” Vol. I ‘Preparatory 
commission of the Council of Europe committee of Ministers Consultative Assembly 11 May – 8 September 1949’ (The 
Hague 1975) 30.  
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designated as an anti-totalitarian instrument; a draft report to the committee of ministers 
described the provision as necessary to prohibit “activities which threaten the preservation of 
democratic rights and freedoms themselves.”23  
The Travaux Préparatoires of the ICCPR reveal similar concerns behind the formation of 
Article 5.
 24
  In a discussion on the text of Article 5 during the 5
th
 and 6
th
 sessions of the 
Commission on Human Rights, the Lebanese and Danish delegates argued that Article 5 
“aimed at checking the growth of nascent Nazi, fascist or other totalitarian ideologies.”25  The 
concern of the majority of delegates appeared to be ensuring that groups with totalitarian 
aims “could not invoke the covenants to justify their activities”. 26  As a consequence a 
majority of states rejected a proposal that the text of Article 5 should be incorporated into 
Article 19 – the provision protecting the right to free speech - as a limitation, as it was argued 
that it was important to prevent totalitarian groups from seeking the protection of the “rights 
to assembly and association.” 27  The need to tackle totalitarianism was used to assuage 
concerns by some states that Article 5 had the potential to justify far reaching restrictions on 
free speech and expression. The prohibition on totalitarianism implicit in Article 5 has been 
referenced in some country reports to the Human Rights Committee: in its 1985 report West 
Germany referred to Article 5(1) in relation to its efforts “to counteract the growth of 
totalitarian ideologies.”28   
In the first judgment on the meaning of Article 17 the European Commission on Human 
Rights rejected the application of the German Communist Party, which had been formally 
                                                          
23
 Ibid. Travaux Préparatoires, Vol IV, 26.  
24
Marc Bossuyt Guide to the 'Travaux Préparatoires of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dordrecht, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1987) 103 -106. This is a collection of all primary documents that compromise the Travaux 
Préparatoires of the ICCPR and direct quotes from these documents are referenced with respect to the relevant page 
numbers in this volume.  
25
 Ibid. 105. 
26
 Ibid. 106. 
27
 Ibid.  
28
UN-Doc. CCPR/C/28/Add.6, paras. 36-37. 
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disbanded by the German Federal Court. As the Communist party had as their stated aim the 
establishment of an avowedly communist society via a proletarian revolution, the 
Commission held that they could not rely on the protection of Articles 9 of the ECHR 
(freedom of conscience/religion), Article 10 (free speech) or Article 11 (freedom of 
association).
29
 This was because the creation of such a society would necessarily undermine 
and suspend a number of rights which the convention guaranteed. In another early case the 
Commission held that the criminal conviction of a National Socialist for political activity was 
justified under the framework of rights restriction set out in Article 17.
30
 Both of these early 
cases reflected the concerns presented during the drafting the ECHR about the need to guard 
against fascism and a potential communist takeover.   
Most historians are relatively consistent in attributing general anti-totalitarian motivations to 
states membership of the Council of Europe and their ratification of the ECHR and the 
interpretation of Article 17 needs to be seen in this broader context. Stephen Greer notes that 
the British government supported creation of the Council of Europe because they were 
convinced that it would become “one of the major weapons of the cold war” and that it could 
provide an ideological counterweight to communist societies.
31
 The British delegate to the 
drafting committee said that the ECHR had to combat the “menace of totalitarianism” and act 
as a “barrier between that totalitarianism and the peoples associated with this Council of 
Europe.”32  Ed Bates argues that one of the reasons a consensus on the creation of a Court of 
human rights was reached, was due to a concern over the protection of democratic values and 
serious violations of human rights.
33
 The European Movement justifying the Court’s creation 
                                                          
29
 Parti Communiste v Federal Republic of Germany (1957) I Yearbook 222 at 224.   
30
 X v Austria (1963) Appl. 1747/62 Yearbook VI 424.  
31
 Stephen Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements Problems and Prospects (CUP 2006) 6-18. 
32
 Travaux Préparatoires (n 22) 27. 
33
 Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From its Inception to the Creation of a Permanent 
Court of Human Rights (OUP 2010) 70-4. 
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in 1949 argued that had it existed prior to 1932 it would have condemned the developments 
in Germany that paved the way for the rise of Hitler.
34
   
Anti-totalitarianism should be conceptually separated from a concern about victims of past 
injustice. As Stephen Hopgood and Samuel Moyn independently argue, the idea of the 
Holocaust and the use of international law to protect victims was a concept that gained 
currency in the early to mid-1960s.
35
 The anti-totalitarian concern reflected in rights abuse 
clauses was teleological; it was concerned with protecting rights in a manner that would lead 
towards the construction of an anti-totalitarian society in the mode of western European 
liberal democracy. Writing in 1991 Anthony Smith noted that in order to achieve European 
unity in a juridical sense a distinct form of European heritage and mythology was 
necessary.
36
  Fighting against totalitarianism was part of that collective memory as which 
ossified as time went on creating a sense which as Slavoj Žižek argued turned totalitarianism 
into a notion that guaranteed a “liberal-democratic hegemony”.37 Article 17 is an example of 
that process. 
The European Court of Human Rights has been relatively consistent in only applying Article 
17 in relation to participatory rights - Articles 9-11 of the ECHR (respectively the right to; 
freedom of conscience, speech and assembly) and Protocol 1 (the right to participate in 
elections). Rights abuse clauses do not justify the limitation of an individual’s personal rights 
due to their political activities posing a potential danger to a human rights instrument. To take 
a hypothetical example: it is possible to limit someone’s speech because they are a Nazi, as 
Nazis historically want to restrict rights, but it would not by the same token be possible to 
                                                          
34
 Goldhaber (n 18) 4.  
35
 Stephen Hopgood The Endtimes of Human Rights (Cornell University Press 2013) 50-2. 
36
 Anthony Smith National Identity (University of Nevada Press 1991).  
37
 Slavoj Žižek  Did Somebody say Totalitarianism: Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion (Verso 2001) 3. 
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deny that individual Nazi a right to a fair trial.
38
 In Lawless v Ireland the European Court of 
Human Rights established that rights abuse clauses would allow general laws outlawing 
extremists using participatory rights so long as any such restrictions did not deprive people of 
fundamental individual rights, such as the right to a fair trial and freedom from unlawful 
detention.
39
 During the Human Rights Commissions deliberations on Article 5 it was stated it 
should only apply in cases where “the destruction of rights” was to a “greater extent than [the 
limitations] provided in the covenants” and that this was not to be read as restricting 
“legitimate criticism” by political movements. 40  For example in the UK a vociferous 
campaign is being run by some politicians in favour of Britain withdrawing from the ECHR 
and whilst this, technically speaking, would undermine “the rights and freedoms” guaranteed 
by the ECHR, it would be treated as legitimate criticism.
41
 
This gives a very wide scope to states to determine what an abuse of rights is and justifies a 
range of laws restricting participatory rights under the general heading of preventing rights 
abuse. As Cannie and Vanhoof argue, Article 17 jurisprudence at the European Court of 
Human Rights has been expanded to apply to groups beyond those seeking to over throw the 
ECHR, to a position that allows states to justify domestic laws criminalising a “broad sphere 
of racial and religious discrimination.”42 This is problematic, as Cannie and Vanhoof argue 
elsewhere, as rights abuse clauses start to “[take] away some democratic guarantees from 
applicants seeking to safeguard their rights.”43  Article 17 can be read as a symptom of a 
wider tension within the ECHR, of reconciling popular sovereignty with the protection of 
                                                          
38
 Phillip Alston and Gerard Quinn ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations under the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156, 208.  
39
 Lawless v Ireland (No 3) (1961) 1 EHRR 15. 
40
 Bossuyt (n 24) 106.  
41
 No state has ever passed laws protecting the ECHR as a document and the fact that Article 58 of the ECHR allows for the 
convention to be denounced by a state party would seem to indicate that it is the advocacy of removing specific rights 
from individuals or groups of individuals that will engage Article 17.  
42
  Cannie and Vanhoof  (n 6). 
43 
Cannie and Voorhoof  'The Abuse Clause in International Human Rights Law: an Expedient Remedy against Abuse of 
Power or an Instrument of Abuse Itself?' from  KP. Vanhoutte & Melanie Lang (eds.) Bullying and the Abuse of Power 
(Interdisciplinary Press 2010) available at http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/critical-issues/  pp.117–124.  
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rights, one that Jana Peterman characterises as inherent to the very nature of liberal 
democracy.
44
 But Article 17, and all rights abuses clauses, explicitly rest on the idea that 
there is a wider existential threat to human rights instruments, which needs to be repelled, and 
cannot be reconciled through pluralist processes such as reason and debate.  It is in this sense 
that Auchter uses the term a ‘haunted’ juridical form as it is predicated on guarding against an 
existential threat of totalitarianism that was specific to the European justification for human 
rights.
45
 The reason for rights abuse clauses permeating into the ICCPR was in part due to the 
highly Eurocentric approach to human rights which dominated the formation of early human 
rights instruments. The way that rights abuse clauses presuppose some kind of existential 
threat to human rights instruments is illustrated in next two sections which show how the 
anti-totalitarianism in rights abuse clauses has led to the construction of a specific form of 
anti-racism.  As the final section argues, this helps explain why human rights tribunals when 
interpreting rights abuse clauses have often adopted a highly restrictive approach when 
considering laws that restrict the freedom of speech.   
 
III.  The ‘Right to Have Rights’, Rights Abuse Clauses and the construction of 
‘historical-reference’ racism   
Racism and racial discrimination was an important component of European totalitarian 
regimes as Hannah Arendt noted, exclusionary ideas based on race were necessary for the 
creation of a totalitarian historical narrative as it facilitated the generation of an exclusionary 
racist narrative.
46
 Of particular concern to Arendt was the creation of states of rightslessness 
                                                          
44
 Jana Peterman ‘Human Rights between sovereign will and international standards: a comment’ from European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (ed.)  Definition and Development of Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty in 
Europe (Council of Europe Publishing 2011) 132. 
45
 Auchter (n 3) 5-6. 
46
 Hannah Arendt ‘Race-Thinking Before Racism’ (1944) 6 The Review of Politics 36. 
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which emerged from denying an individual the “right to have rights” due to their racial 
origin.
47
 Arendt outlined how the targeted destruction of the rights of particular racial groups 
by fascist regimes prior to World War Two enabled them to invent categories of humanity 
that were effectively without rights - or 'rightsless'. These individuals “suffered the loss of 
their homes... [their] entire social texture” which was facilitated by their “loss of government 
protection … [and] legal status” and eventually led to their loss of “life, liberty... equality 
before the law and freedom of opinion.”48 The removal and eventual abolition of rights was 
justified to, and eventually accepted by, society at large due to the construction of a specific 
racist narrative about the rights holding capacity of certain individuals. What totalitarianism 
was able to do, Mary Canovan argues, was provide an explanation of racial struggle within 
laws of historical and biological necessity making  governments bound to the “ ‘laws of 
Nature or of History”  rather than “civil laws protecting rights.”49 
The key function of rights abuse clauses, on a plain textual reading, is to prevent the 
facilitation of states of rightslessness such as those created by totalitarian regimes and both 
Article 17 and Article 5 clearly state that governments are prohibited from engaging in “any 
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights” contained in either the ICCPR or the 
ECHR.
50
 Protecting the right to nationality Eva Ersbøll argues comes closest to addressing 
Arendt’s concern about the creation of rightslessness as the nation state is the primary vehicle 
for rights protection, and in international law the duty holder is the nation state.
 51
 Since 2005 
Protocol 12 of the ECHR has effectively prohibited any removal of nationality on the basis 
that it is discriminatory. The European experience of totalitarianism was characterized by 
                                                          
47
 Arendt The Origins of Totalitarianism (4
th
 ed. Harcourt Books, 1976) 296–297.  
48
 Arendt (n 47) 293–295.  
49
 Margret Canovan ‘Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism an reassessment’ in Dana Villa (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to 
Arendt (CUP 2005) 28. 
50
 The text of both the ICCPR and the ECHR are identical on this point.  
51
 Eva Ersbøll ‘The right to a Nationality and the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Stéphanie Lagoutte, Hans-Otto 
Sano and Peter Scharff Smith (eds.) Human Rights in Turmoil: Facing Threats Consolidating Achievements (Koninkijke Brill 
2007). 
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systematic racism and racist treatment through the creation of rightsless individuals, therefore 
the implicit logic in the operation of rights abuse clauses is that the prohibition of totalitarian 
politics prevents racism. This actually makes Article 17 the provision in the ECHR that is 
closest to a ‘right to have rights’ because, as Kesby argues; the entire concept of the right to 
have rights in international law is an interlocking framework to protect a number of different 
rights, not just a simple right to nationality.
52
 Absent a right to emigrate, immigrate, equality, 
privacy and a family life - the right to nationality would not protect the ability to possess 
rights and may even condemn individuals to having their rights permanently abused in what 
Audrey Macklin called the ‘abyss’ of the nation state.53  
In Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek the European Commission on Human Rights dealt with an 
application from an extremist group who were advocating a policy that if implemented, 
would have led to the systematic removal of nationality for racial minorities and the creation 
of what can only be described as mass Arendtian rightslessness.
54
 The applicant was the 
leader of the ‘Nederlandse Volks Unie’ (NVU) a political party formed in 1971 which 
advocated the creation of an ethnically homogenous society in the Netherlands. The 
applicants were convicted of racial discrimination under the Dutch penal code for distributing 
a leaflet addressed to “white Dutch people” that called for “undesired aliens to leave our 
country as soon as possible.”55 The leaflet went onto say that if the NVU gained political 
power it would “put order into business ... [and] remove Surinamers, Turks and other so 
called guest workers from the Netherlands”.56 The majority of Surinamers residing in the 
Netherlands were Dutch citizens so the leaflet was in effect a call for the mass stripping of 
citizenship from non-whites.  This was the significant point for the Commission who held 
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that as the applicants intended to “remove all non-white people from the Netherlands” they 
were advocating a policy that was a violation of both Article 17 and Article 14 of the 
ECHR.
57
   
The applicants in Glimerveen were challenging domestic laws designed to prevent the 
organization of fascist or communist political groups and reflected an assumption that the 
politics of these groups would be the principle source of racism.
58
 This can loosely be 
described as historical reference anti-racism which, as outlined above, is distinct from anti-
discrimination anti-racism in that it relies on preventing a historical set of circumstances that 
generated racism reoccurring. Many racist political parties and movements in contemporary 
Europe have their origins within Europe’s totalitarian past.  Ann-Laura Stoler’s study of the 
National Front in France illustrates how modern day racist reactions to immigration and 
multiculturalism have roots in France’s fascist past, under the Vichy government, and draw 
on colonial-era conceptions of individuals from France’s former colonies.59 Étienne Balibar 
noted that the emergence of neo-racism in the early 2000’s targeted foreign workers and 
immigrant communities, often from the “ex-colonial or semi-colonial” world in a manner that 
had a long history within Western Europe.
60
 This, Balibar argues, involves situating people of 
other races as “insurmountable obstacles to [societies] living alongside each other” and that 
the individuals of other races were “denaturing” European identities.61 Writing elsewhere 
Balibar argues that what can be described as a neo-racism, with its concern about protecting 
Europe from “Third Worldization”, rests on the notion that underpinned historical racism of 
there being diametrically opposed peoples.
62
 Even though claims to biological supremacy 
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were no longer part of racist discourse in modern extremist politics, Balibar argues, their 
claims as to the radical incommensurability of different peoples shows that they were the 
intellectual inheritors of the fascist racist tradition.
63
 This kind of reasoning was seen in the 
Human Rights Committee’s decision in MA v Italy where the applicant had been convicted 
under the Italian Law of “involvement in "reorganizing the dissolved fascist party”.64  The 
applicant maintained that his conviction was a violation of his rights under the ICCPR and 
the state party invoked Article 5 at the admissibility stage. Whilst the Committee concluded 
that the communication did potentially raise points under Article 19 and 25 of the ICCPR, the 
acts “were of a kind, which are removed from the protection of the Convention” seemingly 
indicating that totalitarianism was outside the scope of human rights protection.
65
 
It is not clear, however, that there exists a form of totalitarian threat of the sort experienced 
by European states in the 1940s from neo-racist organisations and the European Court of 
Human Rights has in recent years become increasingly more sceptical of Article 17 being 
interpreted in this way. In Vona v Hungary the Court concluded that the dissolution of the 
Magyar Gárda organisation by the Hungarian authorities because of its racist actions towards 
the Roma minorities was not a breach of Article 11 because the group posed a “sufficiently 
imminent prejudice to the rights of others”.66 The ban therefore fell within one of the stated 
grounds of restriction contained in the text of Article 11 that allowed the freedom association 
to be restricted in order to prevent disorder and protect of the rights of others. It declined to 
apply Article 17 because the banned group did not “propagate an ideology of oppression 
serving “totalitarian groups.”67 This was applied in relation to hate speech in the case of the 
former National Front leader in France, Jean-Marie Le Pen when he alleged that France’s 
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Muslim minority posed a threat to the country and was convicted under French law for 
“incitement to discrimination”.68 There the Court held that Article 10 of the ECHR allows for 
proportionate restrictions, such as laws criminalising incitement to racial hatred and racial 
discrimination, to be placed on the right to free speech where the aim is to protect racial 
minorities.
69
  
The anti-discrimination approach to racism pursued by the CERD attempts to decouple the 
combating of racism from the specific historical context of anti-fascism. The link between 
anti-racism and resisting fascism was opposed by some delegates during the CERD’s drafting 
process; the Saudi Arabian delegate argued that racism consisted of “countless isms” and 
whilst the greatest “affliction of Europe had been Nazism, for the rest of the world it had … 
been colonialism.”70  Anti-racism in the CERD was framed in terms of preventing racial 
discrimination rather than prohibiting racist ideological groups and the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination has made only scant reference to fascism or other 
historical acts of racism.
71
 Article 1 of the CERD is framed to cover all potential victims and 
construes discrimination broadly, tackling “discrimination in effect as well as aim”, removing 
any requirement of intention behind racial discrimination. 
72
  Article 5 of the CERD contains 
a list of different rights that state parties are obliged to “guarantee the right of everyone, 
without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin”. This shifted the foundation 
of anti-racism from the ideological to the transactional. Anti discrimination provisions 
contained in Protocol 12 of the ECHR and Article 26 of the ICCPR can also be used to tackle 
racial discrimination and to justify laws passed by the governments of state parties to tackle 
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racism.
73
 Rights abuse clauses are unnecessary to protect individuals against racism as both 
the application of qualifications stated within human rights instruments and also general anti-
discrimination provisions would provide a sufficient legal basis for states to limit rights in 
order to prevent racial discrimination. 
IV. Rights abuse clauses and the right to free speech  
One specific example of the dangers of anti-totalitarianism inherent within rights abuse 
clauses is that they can allow state governments to pass far-reaching laws which restrict the 
freedom of speech. This in turn encourages supranational human rights bodies, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Council, to operate a weaker 
standard of scrutiny when reviewing such laws. The reason this danger is inherent within the 
structure of rights abuse clauses, is that the prevention of totalitarianism creates an 
exclusionary political consensus, which prioritizes the restriction of participatory rights, such 
as freedom of speech and freedom of association, in order to guard against totalitarian 
enemies.  
The choices about which restrictions to impose on the exercise of free speech are ultimately 
reflections of a society’s political consensus regarding which interests in society need 
protection. The First Amendment to the US Constitution is a far-reaching free speech clause, 
yet the US Supreme Court has held that some political restrictions of free speech are justified. 
At the height of anti-communist scares in the early 1950s the US Supreme Court held that the 
arrest of the leader of Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USA, 
under powers contained in the 1940 Alien Registration Act did not violate the free speech 
protections of the first amendment.
74
 As Colin Murray notes, the test in the US Supreme 
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Court’s judgement, which assesses whether the “gravity of evil” justifies an invasion of free 
speech, is in effect a test that makes a political judgment about the potential of the 
government to be overthrown.
75
 Subsequent judgements on free speech, Murray notes, have 
retreated from this extreme position, enshrining a “finite capacity for legislation on a limited 
number of virtually absolute rights.”76 This reflects a political culture within the US that 
venerates liberal participatory rights, only restricting them where there is a consensus about 
the gravity of particular emergency.  Famously in Brandenburg v Ohio the Supreme Court 
required a direct link between the speech act and violence, not just the advocacy of 
potentially violent political causes.
77
 This move towards a broad interpretation of free speech 
and a high bar for any law restricting speech acts is cited by some historians as being rooted 
in broad traditions of liberty and libertarianism.
78
 Therefore just as the political consensus in 
the US has led the Supreme Court to allow only limited restrictions of free speech, rights 
abuse clauses reflect the political consensus that was dominant in Europe at the time, which 
was orientated towards preventing a resurgence of totalitarianism.  
Early drafts of Article 29(3) of the UDHR, contained references linking rights abuse clauses 
to its purposes and principles.
79
  In 1950, less than two years after the signing of the UDHR, 
concerns were raised about the potential for rights abuse clauses to limit human rights. The 
US delegate on the drafting committee of the ICCPR was so concerned by the potential of 
rights abuse clauses to pose extensive limitations to the freedom of speech that he proposed a 
motion to have the provision deleted in its entirety.
80
 Although the proposal was defeated by 
the drafting committee, wider concerns about the potential application of Article 5 persisted – 
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in particular the capacity of states to exploit Article 5 to “legitimize actions which 
substantially run counter to [the Convention’s] purposes and general spirit.”81  That same 
year the committee of ministers of the Council of Europe similar concerns were raised about 
early drafts of Article 17 of the ECHR.  The wording of the provision had been proposed by 
the Turkish delegate to the drafting committee to replicate a domestic law in their jurisdiction 
that was designed to “[forbid] the diffusion of propaganda in favour of extremist ideas”.82 
The delegate from the Netherlands asked for the deletion of the paragraph, fearing a 
contradiction between the right to free speech and the rights abuse clause.  In spite of these 
early concerns both clauses made it into the final drafts of the ICCPR and the ECHR. 
Textually Article 17 and Article 5 are much less precise than other provisions about the 
restrictions states are permitted to adopt. Steffan Sottiaux has argued (in relation to the 
ECHR) that this has led to the creation of a “bad tendency test” which allows “the restriction 
of speech with the mere tendency to cause social harm.”83 Sottiaux argues that a bad tendency 
test has developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which has led 
to a weak scrutiny of incitement laws and other restrictions directed against extremist groups 
that engage in racist activities. The Court’s consideration of restrictions justified under 
Article 10 focuses on the nature of the “legitimate goals” of any laws restricting free speech, 
some of which following the text of Article 10 can include “disorder and protecting the 
reputation and rights of others”.84  In practice the European Court of Human Rights has been 
prepared to interpret this broadly ruling that it is legitimate for states to restrict speech to 
preserve “‘political stability” and a “serene social climate.” 85   This allows states a 
considerable margin to pass laws restricting speech because as Sottiaux argues the test 
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deployed by the Court of whether speech constitutes racial hatred focuses on whether the 
language in question is “susceptible to [causing] feelings of hatred” which it equates to 
causing hatred.
86
 In Jersild the majority of the European Court of Human Rights found that 
Denmark had breached Article 10 for imposing criminal fines on journalists who broadcast 
an item about a neo-racist group and did not explicitly condemn the “immorality, dangers and 
unlawfulness” of their racist positions. 87  However, the judgment focused on the fines 
imposed on the journalists not on the scope of anti-racist laws. The dissenting judgments 
argued that given complexities of balancing the freedom of speech with the need to protect 
minorities from discrimination, it was best to leave this balancing act to national legislatures. 
Within this interpretation of margin of appreciation there is a considerable freedom for states 
to pass laws restricting free speech that were intended to tackle historical reference racism.  
The punitive nature of some of the historically inspired laws restricting political organisations 
was highlighted in Lehideux and Isorni when a French newspaper carried an advertisement 
presenting in a positive light certain acts of the government of Marshall Philippe Pétain.
88
 
This was prohibited as a form of collaboration under French law, as it was thought to amount 
to an endorsement of the pro-Nazi puppet government that had ruled Vichy France between 
1940 and 1944, and publications of this sort were subject to criminal sanction. The French 
government claimed, when the case was taken to the European Court of Human Rights, that 
the restrictions were justified under Article 17, but the Court held that the criminalization of 
speech in this manner was disproportionate, noting that “the events referred to in the 
publication in issue had occurred more than forty years before” making it inappropriate to 
punish such actions with the “same severity as ten or twenty years previously.”89 The French 
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government were attempting to use Article 17 as a blanket justification for laws that 
prescribed a particular set of historical interpretations, constructing the concept of rights abuse 
so broadly that they effectively evolved into an anti-fascist instrument. However, in Faurisson 
v France the Human Rights Committee held that far reaching laws criminalising holocaust 
denial were justified as holocaust denial amounted to “activities aimed at the destruction of 
rights.”90 Yet Holocaust denial is not criminalized in many countries and neither the European 
Court of Human Rights nor the Human Rights Committee has held that a state would be in 
violation of state obligations under both Article 17 and Article 5 if they did not criminalize 
Holocaust denial.
91
  
The ‘bad tendency’ thesis outlined by Sottiaux appeared to manifest itself in Norwood v UK. 
The applicant was a member of the British National Party, an extremist political party that 
frequently deployed racist messages.
 92
  He was charged under the UK’s public order 
legislation for displaying a poster showing the September 11
th
 attacks on the World Trade 
Centre with the slogan “Islam out of Britain” and appealed against his conviction on Article 
10 grounds.
93
  The European Court of Human Rights declared the application to be 
inadmissible because in their view the Convention as a whole promoted values, “notably 
tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination” and as such the court was entitled to use 
Article 17 to protect those values.  Whilst the content of the speech act was deeply 
inflammatory, the context and scope of the act was on the facts of the case very limited and 
as Steve Foster argues difficult to square with the Court’s approach Lehideux and Irsoni 
which required intent to undermine the Convention to be demonstrated before engaging 
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Article 17.
94
 The promotion of “tolerance” and “social peace” are wide ranging and 
seemingly open values which could be used to justify a wide range of laws criminalising, 
speech, association, political participation and freedom of conscience.  As Foster notes it is 
questionable in Norwood that speech and conduct “should be denied the basic principles” of 
“proportionality just because [it is] racially motivated” and that by invoking Article 17 the 
state party had not been required to justify these restrictions “in line with the principles of 
legality and necessity”.95  
In Norwood the Court repeated the common refrain that “the general purpose of Article 17 is 
to prevent individuals or groups with totalitarian aims” which implicitly refers back to the 
historical consensus against totalitarianism at the time of the EHCR’s foundation.96  Similar 
themes are seen in the Human Rights Committee’s jurisprudence and commentary on rights 
abuse clauses. Alex Conte in his analysis of Article 5 of the ICCPR argues that it attempts to 
“balance social freedoms” in line with the principles set out in paragraph 5 of the preamble to 
the ICCPR which states that “everyone has duties…in the social communities to which they 
belong”.97 This implied that rights abuse clauses were aimed at creating a unified community 
to resist against totalitarianism, making any attempt to engage in totalitarian like activities a 
breach of an individual’s duties to their community and rendering political activities of the 
sort that mimicked or echoed historical totalitarian ideas outside of the protection of human 
rights instruments.  
When reading M and Norwood in tandem it is possible to piece together a deeper purposive 
consensus about both the ICCPR and ECHR. The European consensus behind the ECHR has 
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been widely discussed in the context of judicial reasoning by the European Court of Human 
Rights.  The European Consensus, as defined by Judge Colver of the Court, is a reflection of 
a “universal agreement” by elites and citizens “on the core values of the Convention system” 
which he argues “is the most effective means of defending it [the ECHR].”98 Even in the 
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine, which has often been interpreted as 
permitting a wide degree of divergence on moral standards among states, there has, as Ian 
Leigh argues been no real explanation offered as to why “more morally conservative states 
have not been permitted [by the European Court] to invoke the margin of appreciation on 
religious matters.” 99   An exclusionary consensus about the limits and ends of rights is 
incipient in the interpretation that the Court and Committee have placed upon rights abuse 
clauses in the ECHR and the ICCPR respectively, as they are instruments that reflect a 
common desire to prevent repetition or re-emergence of totalitarian politics, which has been 
interpreted to mean that anyone who is by association connected with totalitarian politics is in 
effect outside the consensus about who and what they should protect. This consensus is also 
seen in state legislative practice. As Loytomaki notes several ex-socialist Eastern European 
states have criminalized denial of the communist crimes, following the model of Western 
European states for criminalising Holocaust denial.
100
 This consensus towards criminalising 
the aspects of speech, and constructing a past, underscores the construction of a consensus 
about historical memory and the purpose of rights. 
This consensus has in effect justified the weak standard of scrutiny applied to the domestic 
laws of state parties that restrict rights; their capacity to reflect the anti-totalitarian consensus 
can at times appear more pertinent than their capacity to serve as proportional limitations on 
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rights in the interests of preventing racism in society. This reflection of broad and 
exclusionary historical anti-totalitarian consensus by rights abuse clauses reflects a specific 
teleology of rights where, as Illan ru Wall argues, human rights are read as “evidence of a 
hand of providence or progress” which places “our contemporary selves at the end of 
history.”101 This, Wall argues, creates “naturalness” to human rights and attempts to render 
them “necessary” by locating inevitable social progress towards increasing rights 
protection.
102
 If a teleological narrative of human rights evolution, in a European context, is 
characterized by the prevention of totalitarianism it therefore becomes natural for human 
rights to exclude those with any connection to historical forms of totalitarianism.  All human 
rights instruments rely on some form of consensus over the rights to be protected and the 
victims of human rights abuses, but rights abuse clauses are evidence of what Anna Greer 
describes as the “tilt” of universality towards a western conception of rights – or, more 
accurately in the case of rights abuses clauses, the Western European conception of rights 
restrictions.
103
 The seemingly inconsistent approach of international tribunals on the specific 
issue of restrictions of free speech by rights abuses clauses, is not an inconsistency at all but 
rather a reflection of a Western European anti-totalitarian consensus.  
V. Conclusion 
The literature on rights abuse clauses has often criticized their application as being inherently 
antithetical to the application of free speech. Yet, as argued above, this line of argument is a 
misunderstanding of the function of rights abuse clauses. They are a reflection of a consensus 
against totalitarianism and indeed any form of politics that refers to the past totalitarian 
threats that were experienced by Western European states. By implication the very idea of a 
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‘rights abuse’ indicates that there is a proper or accepted use of rights and this implicit 
rationale behind these provisions helps to explain how these provisions justify the extreme 
restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of association. The rationale behind rights 
abuses clauses was that groups within a state could pose an ongoing threat to the human 
rights instrument and the protection of rights themselves. This was often strained in the 
process of interpretation allowing the growth of restrictive interpretations of rights abuse 
clauses. In this respect the European Court of Human Rights clear restatement that Article 17 
requires there to be an actual threat of overthrowing or undermining rights to be operative, 
represents a curbing of these provisions as instruments of state power.
104
  
Rights abuse clauses have however preformed one often understated task – they have 
addressed the problem, first identified by Arendt, of protecting the right to have rights. This 
should not however be interpreted as a defence of rights abuse clauses. Even where they 
perform the function of protecting the right to have rights they are relatively crude tools for 
combating racism when other provisions in human rights instruments do an equivalent and 
arguably superior job. Rights abuse clauses are an inevitable symptom of the attempt to 
construct a consensus necessary for the construction of a human rights instrument, and that if 
rights abuse clauses did not exist something else would simply take its place. This does not 
justify their continued presence within human rights instruments but their continued presence 
illustrates how human rights instruments can remain haunted by the politics of their 
foundations. To use Autchter’s argument, rights abuse clauses are where it is possible to 
identify the “hauntological” foundations of a human rights instrument allowing “the claimed 
reality” in which that instrument operates to be “called into question.”105  
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Understanding rights abuse clauses, to again deploy Autcher’s terminology, almost as a 
memorial to the totalitarian past of Europe, where individuals quite literally lost the right to 
have rights helps to understand why such a seemingly regressive provision still has a place 
within some contemporary human rights instruments. This however remains a distinctly 
Eurocentric memorial and one which, as indicated by the discussions surrounding the 
formation of the CERD, only serves to underscore the seemingly Western-centric nature of 
International Human Rights Law. By treating them more as a passive memorial and less as an 
active provision on rights limitations, international tribunals may in the future be able to 
reserve their use for those exceedingly rare cases where there is a genuine danger of 
totalitarianism, and not use allow state parties to engage in seemingly open ended restrictions 
of rights.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
